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I. INTRODUCTION

America is currently facing an imminent disaster which the vast majority of its citizens
are entirely unaware of. This disaster has nothing to do with militant terrorist organizations. It
likewise does not involve an impending worldwide shortage of fossil fuels. Nor does it entail the
potential development of nuclear weapons in hostile nations. Rather, this disaster exists much
closer to home. America is presently facing an impending shortage of productive agricultural
land. For many years, governments at every level have allowed unplanned, rapid-fire,
speculative development to occur virtually unrestrained in every area of this country. This
development is occurring almost exclusively on productive agricultural land. The result:
America’s most productive agricultural lands are quickly being replaced with strip malls,
apartment complexes, and shopping centers—in other words, suburban sprawl. This widespread
conversion of agricultural land is pervasive, and it is a disaster that is swiftly reaching a
crescendo.
The citizens of this nation are currently experiencing a very differentstate of affairs than
our forefathers were accustomed to. At the time of this country’s founding, Thomas Jefferson
envisioned America as a nation built of small communities, each organized around subsistence
farming. Agriculture was to be the cornerstone of the nation’s economy. Jefferson’s vison is
quite obviously archaic in comparison to modern corporate America. Yet, most contemporary
Americans would likely scoff at the notion that the country is now facing an imminent shortage
of agricultural land. However, this is the reality of the situation currently facing this nation. At
current rates, allof America’s productive agricultural land will be gone in a little over two
hundred years. This country’s agricultural land has quite literally become endangered.
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Moreover, the rate at which this nation’s productive agricultural land is developed and
converted to other uses continues to increase, due to a wide variety of factors. Much of
America’s most productive agricultural land is located in immediate proximity to urban areas.
Thus, as urban areas continue their natural expansion, this prime agricultural land is situated
directly in the path of encroaching development. In addition, the market for development has
operated for years in such a way that the long term consequences of land conversion are not
properly accounted for. This is because the demand for development continues to escalate at a
rate that exceeds localities’ ability to plan for the resulting growth. Rather than adjust their land
use planning schemes to effectively balance competing interests, the majority of states have
simply allowed the market to dictate the pace and manner of development. Expansion thus
occurs in an unplanned, scattered fashion, and productive agricultural land is therefore frequently
replaced with suburban sprawl. Governments on both a national and state level have long been
aware of this phenomenon, yet have not come close to reaching a solution to it. Sprawl and
agglomeration threaten to devour the most productive agricultural land in America, and as of
today there exists no settled strategy to stem the flow.
Yet, this is not a problem that is inherently incapable of solution. The federal
government and state and local governments possess all of the powers and land use planning
tools necessary to accomplish the task, but have not yet fashioned a proper remedy. The answer
lies in organization and implementation. The efforts of governments at all levels must be
coordinated to assist in the development and implementation of a comprehensive land use
planning model. The rapid nation-wide conversion of prime agricultural land can only be
effectively managed by a comprehensive land use planning model that is flexible enough to
allow development and preservation to complement one another, and sufficiently elastic that it
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can be adapted to suit the unique needs of each state. While productive agricultural land is being
converted to suburban sprawl in every state in America, no single scheme is capable of
uniformly solving the problem. Rather, states need a model that can be altered as needed to
account for the differences among localities while still reaching the same end result. Thus, the
goal of this Article is to lay the groundwork for the development of a model that incorporates
various land use planning tools in a way that will allow localities to properly balance competing
interests to ensure that development occurs in an intelligent, well-planned manner, and that
agricultural lands are not unnecessarily sacrificed.
Part II of this Article provides detailed statistical evidence proving that productive
agricultural land is being developed and converted to suburban sprawl in every state and locality
in America. Part II also demonstrates that, because of market pressures and the general location
of America’s most productive agricultural land, the rate at which agricultural land is being
developed and converted to other uses continues to escalate. In addition, an account of the
problems resulting from this phenomenon is provided, as well a description of the benefits of
agricultural land—both economic and otherwise. Part III discusses land use planning programs
implemented by both the federal government and state and local governments, concluding that
the measures currently being utilized are insufficient to adequately balance the competing
interests of development and agricultural land preservation. Part IV considers the legal
implications of a comprehensive land use planning model, with particular emphasis placed on
Fifth Amendment “takings” challenges to the implementation of land use restrictions such as
agricultural zoning. Finally, Part V provides suggestions for the development of a
comprehensive land use planning model. Part V proposes a framework to coordinate the
respective efforts and capabilities of the federal government, state and local governments, and
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even private organizations, to assist with the implementation of a land use planning scheme
designed to preserve America’s productive and valuable agricultural land while ensuring that
development proceeds in an intelligent fashion. In addition to suggesting a framework for
governmental organization, Part V provides a detailed example of the manner in which various
land use planning tools can be deployed as part of a comprehensive land use planning scheme
that can be adapted to account for differences among states and localities while achieving
uniform results.

II. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN PRODUCTIVE AGRICULTURAL LAND AND SUBURBAN SPRAWL

Urban expansion is irrevocably changing the landscape of America. While the migration
of America’s populace to urban areas—and the growth of urban areas—has been a dominant
social trend for decades, the rate of urbanization has increased dramatically in recent years.
Between 1982 and 1997 the population of the United States grew by seventeen percent, but the
amount of urbanized land in America increased by forty-seven percent.1 Current estimates place
the amount of land being developed in America each year at two million acres.2 Most of this
land is productive agricultural land; “conservative” estimates place the amount of productive
agricultural land developed each year at approximately one million acres.3 Currently, two acres

1

See American Farmland Trust, Farming on the Edge: Major Findings, at
http://www.farmland.org/farmingontheedge/major_findings.htm [hereinafter Major National Findings] (discussing
population growth in relation to urbanization).
2
David C. Levy & Rachael P. Melliar-Smith, The Race for the Future: Farmland Preservation Tools, 18 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 15 (2003).
3
See David L. Szlanfucht, How to Save America’s Depleting Supply of Farmland, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333, 336
(1999). However, it should be noted that some studies have found that the average annual loss of agricultural land
to other uses to be much higher. For example, Luther Tweeten estimates that agricultural land in America is
converted to other uses at a rate of four million acres annually. See Luther Tweeten, Food Security and Farmland
Preservation, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 237, 240 (1998) (discussing average annual loss of agricultural land between
1945 and 1992).
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of productive agricultural land are developed and converted to other uses each minute.4 At this
rate, all of the agricultural land in America will be exhausted by the year 2225.5 However, this
land will likely be lost much sooner because the rate at which agricultural land is being
developed and converted to other uses continues to increase. Agricultural land was developed
fifty-one percent faster during the 1990s than during the 1980s.6 Of this land, the most
productive land is being lost more quickly; the rate of conversion for prime agricultural land
between 1992 and 1997 was thirty-one percent higher than for non-prime agricultural land.7
This escalation is unlikely to slow because for the majority of America’s mostproductive
farmland is directly in the path of development. Eighty-six percent of the fruits and vegetables
and sixty-three percent of the dairy products produced in the United States are produced on
agricultural land located immediately contiguous to urban areas.8 In fact, “fewer than one-fifth
of rural counties in North America now have a significant economic dependence on farming.”9
Therefore, the majority of America’s prime agricultural land is perfectly situated for
development. As urban areas expand, America’s most productive agricultural land will continue
to be converted to other uses.
Moreover, the rate at which agricultural land in areas adjacent to urban centers is
developed will continue to increase as a function of the market. Many American consumers
desire to build homes on large lots, which are often unavailable (at least at an affordable price) in
metropolitan areas.10 In addition, “the high cost of housing in major cities and coastal
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Major National Findings, supra note 1.
See Tweeten, supra note 3, at 240.
6
Major National Findings, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
John W. Keller, The Importance of Rural Development in the 21st Century – Persistence, Sustainability, and
Futures, at http://www.law.du.edu/rmlui/HotTopics/Keller2000ImportanceofRuralDevelopment.htm.
10
See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Agricultural Zoning: Impacts and Future Directions, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 419, 441
(2002) (noting that suburban sprawl exists because it “is what a significant number of consumers want”); Major
5

6

environments” drives many people to search for homes in outlying areas.11 Therefore,
consumers create an escalating demand for the development of land contiguous to urban areas.12
Because America’s most productive agricultural land is located near urban areas, this land
provides the supply. Therefore, developers naturally focus on the productive agricultural land
surrounding America’s urban centers as they respond to consumers’ demand. Developers also
have a more basic reason to develop and convert agricultural land to other uses: farmland is
particularly attractive because it is flat, well-drained, and therefore easily converted to
commercial, industrial, or residential purposes.13 As Chicago journalist Robert Heuer points out,
“historically, planners’ bread and butter has been planting subdivisions on farmland.”14
The significant effect of normal market pressures on the pace of development is
exacerbated by the fact that local governments in outlying areas either ignore the fact that
agricultural land is being developed and converted to other uses or even encourage it. For
example, local governments often promote land development as an economic policy because
they believe that development will increase the tax base.15 Quite often, these pressures combine

National Findings, supra note 1 (“[S]ince 1994, 10+ acre housing lots have accounted for 55 percent of the land
developed.”).
11
Levy, supra note 2, at 15.
12
Many other factors that contribute to consumers’ demand for the development of agricultural land have been
noted. For example, telecommunications have had an increasing impact in recent years. Developments in
telecommunications are “releasing households from location constraints related to maximum acceptable time and
distance.” Keller, supra note 9. Because people are not nearly as bound by location as they were in the past, people
consider a wider range of options when making housing choices, and more frequently choose to live further away
from city centers. Id.
13
See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing trend in which developers replace productive farmland with
urban sprawl); Guadalupe T. Luna, “Agricultural Underdogs” and International Agreements: The Legal Context of
Agricultural Workers Within the Rural Economy, 26 N.M. L. REV. 9, 51 (noting underlying rationale for developers’
attraction to rural areas).
14
Tom Daniels & Deborah Bowers, HOLDING OUR GROUND: PROTECTING AMERICA’S FARMS AND FARMLAND 3435 (Island Press 1997) [hereinafter HOLDING OUR GROUND].
15
See Cordes, supra note 10, at 442 (discussing governmental subsidization of scattered development, “especially in
terms of roads”); Levy, supra note 2, at 17 (“Cash-strapped local governments must, therefore, rely on sales tax and
other revenues from commercial development to fund their operations. This leads to a competition for development,
often at the expense of prime agricultural land . . . .”). This frequently occurs in spite of the fact that fiscal costs due
to service provision demands actually outweigh revenue generation on developed land. See infra at notes 35-40 and
accompanying text.
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to produce land development and conversion at a greater pace than local governments can
reasonably plan for.16 Before a local government realizes what is occurring and implements a
proper land use planning scheme to deal with the development, the conversion of the locality’s
agricultural land to other uses is already well under way. Thus, the development and conversion
of agricultural land often proceeds solely as a function of the market. The result is that land
development in such areas is frequently accomplished in a scatter-shot, unplanned manner.17 In
other words, America’s most productive agricultural land, situated in close proximity to large
urban centers, is being replaced with suburban sprawl.18 “Traditional rural communities lying
within 65 to 120 kilometers of the metropolitan fringe show a strong propensity to expand . . . .
[creating] quite possibl[y] the final wave of spatial development of large urban centers before
urban agglomeration occurs.”19
This phenomenon is not in any manner localized, for productive agricultural land is being
developed and converted to other uses at an increasing rate in nearly every state in America. For
example, Atlanta has been referred to as “the most sprawl-threatened region in the United
States,” based on the fact that the area surrounding the city loses an average of 2,000 acres of
agricultural land to other uses each month.20 Texas is currently the most sprawl-threatened state
in the nation,21 having had 332,800 acres of prime agricultural land developed and converted to

16

See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 341 (noting that development is often typified by “high demand, low costs,
and the absence of developmental oversight by local governments”).
17
See id.; Cordes, supra note 10, at 441-42.
18
According to Cordes, while the concept of suburban sprawl is appalling to most Americans in the abstract, the
market does not permit this problem to self-correct. See id. (“[C]onsumer preferences . . . fail to consider the
broader social costs of their actions and thus leads to an inefficient allocation of resources. The market, as reflected
in consumer choices, fails to consider all the costs and benefits in a transaction; they are external to the
decisionmaking process.”).
19
Keller, supra note 9. Keller notes that the current trend in many urban areas is “emptiness at the center and
growth on the edges.” Id.
20
See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing urban sprawl in Atlanta); Neil R. Pierce, Urban Sprawl
Increasingly a Political Issue, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 12, 1998, at 26 (describing suburban sprawl and resulting
problems).
21
See Major National Findings, supra note 1.
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other uses between 1992 and 1997 (a forty-two percent increase from the previous five years).22
Even less populous states are not immune to this phenomenon. For example, 17,800 acres of
prime agricultural land were developed and converted to other uses in Utah between 1992 and
1997 (a forty-eight percent increase from the previous five years).23
The negative consequences of such rapid-fire, unplanned development and conversion of
prime agricultural land are numerous. As an initial matter, America’s most productive
agricultural land is no longer available to provide valuable resources necessary for the country’s
general welfare. Another equally obvious consequence is that the natural beauty and open space
that once existed are now permanently obliterated. The widespread expansion of public services
such as sewer systems and roads—necessary to support the newly developed land—not only
promotes additional conversion and sprawl,24 but also frequently destroys entire ecosystems and
without exception contributes to rising levels of pollution.25 Additionally, the subdivisions and
strip malls that typify suburban sprawl often leave behind blight and poverty in inner cities as the
populace becomes concentrated on the urban fringe.26 Nor is such development beneficial for
many of the communities in which agricultural land is being converted to other uses. For
example, market and governmental forces exert such pressure in favor of development that

22

American Farmland Trust, Farming on the Edge: Major Findings, at
http://www.farmland.org/farmingontheedge/major_allstates.htm [hereinafter Major State Findings].
23
Id. This trend is unlikely to ebb, for Utah’s population increased by more than ten percent between 1995 and
2000. See Levy, supra note 2, at 15.
24
See James H. Wickersham, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New Model for State Growth
Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 495 (1994). See also Neil D. Hamilton, Plowing New
Ground: Emerging Policy Issues In A Changing Agriculture, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 181, 192 (1997) (“While those
roads may now be lined with bountiful farms, the nearby growth and installation of services, such as sewer and
water, means that in five years most of those farms will no longer exist.”); HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at
50 (“Civilization follows the sewer line.”).
25
See Patrick J. Skelley, Defending the Frontier (Again): Rural Communities, Leapfrog Development, and Reverse
Exclusionary Zoning, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 273, 287 (1997). See also Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 341 (“This trend
increases the rate of stormwater runoff, which in turn increases the flow of pollutants to discharge areas including
rivers and streams.”).
26
See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 340 (discussing how suburban sprawl “accelerates the decline and
deterioration” of urban areas); see also Keller, supra note 9 (discussing growth of the urban fringe).
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agricultural land is often converted to residential use before the necessary infrastructure is in
place.27 Thus, many home-buyers moving to such areas are rewarded with “soaring property tax
rates” imposed by local governments to cover the costs of necessary public services.28 Such
consequences turn the forces in favor of development on their respective heads and beg the
question: when does development, especially development accomplished in an unplanned
manner, become a detriment to society?
Even if one ignores the many negative consequences of suburban sprawl and urban
agglomeration, agricultural land merits strong protection from a land use planning perspective
because of the numerous benefits it provides. America’s agricultural land “provide[s] much of
the nation’s food and fiber and has a significant impact on the U.S. economy.”29 Preserving
America’s prime agricultural land results in reduced prices for produce generally; because
America is not reliant on foreign produce, the prices of foreign produce are driven down,
resulting in the competitive pricing of both local and imported goods.30 Thus, agricultural land
provides a tremendous benefit to the nation’s welfare,31 a benefit that decreases corresponding to
the increasing rate at which agricultural land is developed and converted.
In addition, and contrary to popular belief, protecting agricultural land rather than
allowing it to be developed and converted to other uses can be economically beneficial to
27

See James Poradek, Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan Land-use Planning: Private Enforcement of Urban
Sprawl Control Laws, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1997).
28
Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 341.
29
Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 338. See also Steven C. Bahls, Preservation of Family Farms: The Way Ahead, 45
DRAKE L. REV. 311, 322-25 (1997) (discussing society’s interest in protecting safety of its food).
30
See, e.g., Anthony R. Arcaro, Avoiding Constitutional Challenges to Farmland Preservation Legislation, 24
GONZ. L. REV. 475, 495 (1988-89) (“[C]heaper local produce helps keep down the cost of imported farm products . .
.”).
31
While agricultural land protection measures on the national level have largely been unsuccessful to date, see infra
notes 43-77 and accompanying text (discussing failure of agricultural land protection measures imposed by federal
government), the federal government has recognized the importance of agricultural land to the nation’s welfare for
many years. For example, the preamble to the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 states that “the maintenance of the
family farm system of agriculture is essential to the social well being of the Nation” and that farming is “essential to
. . . the competitive production of adequate supplies of food and fiber.” Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-98 § 1608 Stat. 1213, 1347 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §2266 (1994)).
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localities as well. As discussed previously, the market generally sets a trend in favor of
increased development and conversion.32 However, the market for land development is
inefficient because many of the actors (consumers, developers, and local governments) suffer
from an information deficiency.33 The market for agricultural land conversion often places so
much pressure on these actors in favor of development that all of the costs and benefits cannot be
properly weighed.34 Thus, development frequently proceeds in an ad hoc and unplanned fashion.
As a result, most state and local governments are unaware of the extent to which agricultural
land contributes to theeconomy. Agricultural land actually helps subsidize local governments
because it provides greater revenue in the form of property taxes than it requires in public
services.35 For example, studies conducted by the American Farmland Trust demonstrate that
agricultural land requires only $0.21 to $0.75 in public services for every dollar it generates in
property tax revenues.36 In comparison, residential land requires $1.05 to $1.67 in public
services for every dollar generated in property tax revenues.37 Thus, while “farmland protection
is fiscally responsible . . . residential growth does not pay its own way.”38 Moreover, while
commercial and industrial land uses generally provide more in tax revenue than they demand in
public services,39 they also result in suburban sprawl because they “encourage residential growth
and development, whereas farms do not.”40 In addition, commercial farms provide good
investment opportunities, supply jobs, raise a large amount of income, and contribute to the tax

32

See Cordes, supra note 10, at 441 (discussing consistent market trend in favor of development).
See, e.g., id. at 441-42 (discussing inefficiency in market for development).
34
See id.
35
See Sean F. Nolan Cozota Solloway, Note and Comment, Preserving Our Heritage: Tools to Cultivate
Agricultural Preservation in New York State, 17 PACE L. REV. 591, 640 (1997); Holly L. Thomas, DUTCHESS
COUNTY PLANNING DEP’T, TECH MEMO: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF LAND CONSERVATION 1 (1991).
36
HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 55.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 339.
33
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base—all while demanding few public services expenditures by local governments. Given all of
these benefits, seldom considered because of market pressures, state and local governments
should recognize that “promoting local agriculture is a form of economic development.”41
Accordingly, state and local governments should include agricultural land preservation as a
ubiquitous component of their land use planning schemes.
In summary, current statistics demonstrate that America’s prime agricultural land is being
developed and converted to other uses at an increasing rate nationwide. The conversion of this
nation’s most productive agricultural land into suburban sprawl and urban agglomeration is
unlikely to yield, for the majority of such land is directly in the path of development and current
market pressures favor development and conversion. Yet, America’s agricultural land is a
valuable resource that provides a benefit, a benefit which is non-renewable once these lands are
developed and converted. Accordingly, a comprehensive land use planning model is needed, one
that adequately accounts for the need to preserve this valuable resource while still allowing
development to occur in a controlled fashion. The fact that agricultural land continues to be
converted at increasing rates demonstrates that current measures are failing. If a viable solution
is not soon discovered, “the last crop produced on much of the nation’s prime farmland will be
asphalt.”42

III. A MODEL OF INEFFECTIVENESS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAND USE PLANNING SCHEMES

As the preceding Section demonstrates, America is in dire need of a solution to the
increasing development and conversion of prime agricultural land. Obviously, the programs

41
42

HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 17 (emphasis added).
Solloway, supra note 35, at 595.
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enacted to date have not successfully addressed this problem, for productive agricultural land is
being developed and converted to other uses in an unplanned, unintelligent manner at increasing
rates nationwide. Indeed, it is widely recognized that most programs developed ostensibly to
protect agricultural land have proven ineffective.43 A new land use planning model is needed,
one thatincludes the preservation of agricultural land as a major component yet is
comprehensive enough to account for the factors that contribute to agricultural land conversion
in various localities. In devising such a plan, it is appropriate to first consider the actions that
have already been taken by both national and state governments. While no government has
enacted a comprehensive land use planning scheme capable of solving this problem, the failings
of previously enacted plans should inform any discussion of the proper way to engage in
comprehensive land use planning. Progress can never be made when the mistakes of the past are
not considered and addressed. Accordingly, the following Sections examine actions taken by
national and state governments, respectively, to protect agricultural land.

A. Federal Protection for Agricultural Land

The federal government has been passing legislation dealing with agricultural land for
many years. For example, during the New Deal the federal government passed a wide array of
agricultural legislation—legislation providing for, among other things, widespread subsidy
programs, rehabilitation loans, and government land purchases.44 However, the escalating rates
of agricultural land conversion and suburban sprawl have stimulated a growing national

43

See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 335 (“[M]any of the enacted programs to protect farmland have proven to be
largely ineffective.”).
44
See Todd A. Wildermuth, National Land Use Planning in America, Briefly, 26 J. LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L.
73, 74-75 (2005).
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awareness of the problems associated with these trends in recent years. This awareness has
forced the federal government to pay increased attention to the problems by passing legislation
purporting to address these important land use issues.45 As early as 1975, the Committee on
Land Use for the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) recommended that steps be
taken to maximize the retention of agricultural land.46 In the years since, the federal government
has passed legislation enacting many programs supposedly designed to stimulate the protection
and preservation of agricultural land.47 However, the federal government has traditionally
viewed land use matters in general—and land use planning schemes in particular—as matters of
local concern.48 Accordingly, the approach taken by the federal government has largely been
one of abstention, whereby specificprograms are designed to incentivize the private sector to
protect agricultural land. However, these programs are not deployed as any sort of
comprehensive land use planning strategy.49 In fact, most federal programs enacted to date have
been “little more than token attempts at farmland protection.”50 In contrast, over ninety federal
spending programs have a significant effect on the location and cost of private development, but
do surprisingly littleto regulate or supervise the industry’s impact on agricultural land. For

45

This Section deals only with legislation purportedly designed to directly protect and preserve agricultural land,
and thus does not discuss other federal programs that impact agricultural land, such as federal subsidy programs. It
should be noted that federal subsidy programs suffer from the same failings as the rest of the federal legislation, for
they are not deployed as part of a coordinated national land use program. Id. at 80.
46
See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 75.
47
This section is in no way meant to be a comprehensive list of federal legislation relating to agricultural land and
suburban sprawl. While Congress has frequently passed legislation that purportedly addresses the depletion of
agricultural lands, few of the enacted programs have been successful. See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at
76. Therefore, this section will only address the more significant legislative programs. For a more comprehensive
discussion of federal legislation dealing with this issue, see Levy, supra note 2, at 15-18 and HOLDING OUR
GROUND, supra note 14, at 75-85.
48
The federal government has come remarkably close to adopting a national land use planning program on two
separate occasions: during the New Deal and again during the 1970s. See Wildermuth, supra note 44, at 75-78.
Both times, the proposed program failed miserably. Id. Wildermuth describes the federal government’s current
strategy with regard to land use planning as “piecemeal.” Id. at 73.
49
See, e.g., HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 75 (“[T]he federal government has nothing close to a coherent
strategy to protect farmland.” (emphasis added)).
50
Id. at 76.
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example, the federal highway program increases access to outlying areas and thus promotes
suburban sprawl. Because the federal government has taken surprisingly few steps to coordinate
its various programs, the result is that the federal government has, in effect, helped “subsidize[ ]
the conversion of millions of acres in farmland over the past fifty years.”51 While the vast
majority of federal legislation has done little to curtail the rapid development of agricultural land,
several programs are worth noting, if more for their failings than for their successes.
In 1981 Congress passed the Farmland Protection Policy Act52 (“FPPA”) after a study of
the nation’s agricultural lands demonstrated that a large amount of productive agricultural land
had been developed and converted to other uses between 1967 and 1977.53 The goal of the
FPPA was to reduce federal contribution to agricultural land depletion byforcing fe deral
agencies to coordinate their administration of federal programs with agricultural land
preservation policies and programs administered by state and local governments.54 Under the
FPPA, a federal agency is required to submit a Farmland Conversion Rating Form to the Natural
Resources Conservation Service whenever a federally funded project will contribute to farmland
conversion.55 These reports serve as the basis for a yearly presentation that the USDA gives to
Congress regarding “the impacts of federal programs and projects on farmland conversion.”56
However, this reporting scheme serves as little more than an information gathering vehicle for
Congress. Because the FPPA does not require that federal agencies actually take any action to
minimize the impact of federal programs on the conversion of agricultural land, federal agencies

51

Id.
Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1341 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §
1451 (1994)).
53
See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 76.
54
Id. at 76-77.
55
Id. at 77.
56
Id.
52
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may proceed to administer their programs as they like. 57 Accordingly, the only real benefit of
the reporting requirement is transparency, which amounts to little more than a “bland
acknowledgement of concern, setting forth a very limited role for the federal government” in
land use planning.58
However, the FPPA does contain one distinct benefit: the creation of a land evaluation
and site assessment (“LESA”) system.59 The LESA is a statistical rating system that attempts to
objectively rate the quality and productivity of agricultural land on a numerical basis.60 The
objective of the LESA system is to gather data that will assist state and local governments in
identifying prime agricultural land for preservation.61 However, the federal LESA system suffers
from a serious shortcoming in that the rating of agricultural land is generally lowered (and thus
deemed less worthy of protection) as surrounding developmental pressures increase.62 Thus,
under the federal LESA system, the rating of America’s most productive farmland—the vast
majority of which is located near large urban areas—is artificially deflated. For example, highly
productive agricultural land in areas such as California’s Central Valley receives a low rating
under the federal LESA system despite being some of the most productive agricultural land in
the entire United States. 63 Despite its failings, however, the federal LESA system has been put
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to use as a land use planning mechanism in a majority of states; by 1996, the system was being
used in over thirty states.64
Following its initial attempt to preserve agricultural land with the FPPA, Congress
enacted the 1985 Farm Bill a few years later.65 This legislation was designed to promote the
preservation of agricultural land by providing an incentive for private landowners to establish
conservation easements on their land.66 The Bill accomplished this through a debt-reduction-foreasement provision that empowered the Farm Service Agency(“FSA”) “to reduce the debt
obligation of farmers who donate a conservation easement on their nonproductive land to the
agency.”67 However, the program was almost a complete failure, as virtually no landowners
chose to enroll with the FSA. While over 66,000 agricultural landowners had contacted the
agency to attempt to have their debt reduced as of 1989, only approximately 400 actually
expressed a desire to be considered for the program.68
Congress has also passed several acts designed to either grant or lend federal funds to
states for use in protecting agricultural lands. For example, in 1990 Congress passed the Farms
for the Future Act (“FFA”).69 The FFA enacted a “purchase of development rights” (“PDR”)
program, whereby the federal government would lend federal money to states to be used to
purchase the development rights on privately-owned agricultural land.70 Under the FFA, the
federal government allocated up to ten million dollars in federal money per year to be lent to
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states willing to match half of the federal funds.71 The FFA was replaced six years later when
Congress upped the ante by passing the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of
1996 (“FAIR”).72 FAIR replaced the lending approach of the FFA by simply allocating federal
grant money for states with dedicated farmland preservation programs to use to purchase
conservation easements on privately-owned agricultural land.73 The program, known as the
Farmland Protection Program, allocated thirty-five million dollars in federal grant money to be
used to purchase such easements.74 However, the program had very limited success and was
shortly repealed.75 FAIR was then replaced by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
200276 (“FSRIA”), which does little more than update FAIR and signal a return to the fundmatching nature of the FSA.77 Under the FSRIA, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized “to
purchase land or conservation easements for the purpose of protecting topsoil by limiting
nonagricultural uses of the land.”78 The purchases are accomplished by the USDA partnering
with state and local governments as well as nongovernmental organizations to provide up to half
of the fair market value for such easements.79 Thus, as with the FSA, the FSRIA only requires
the federal government to provide half of the funds for conservation easements.
Two major flaws exist regarding all of the legislation described above, supposedly
designed to increase the preservation of productive agricultural land. First, the federal
government has done remarkably little to ensure that its legislative programs function as part of a
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comprehensive land use planning program designed to preserve agricultural land. Instead, the
federal government has passed legislation that functions in isolation, legislation that merely
provides incentives for private landowners to refrain from developing their agricultural land.
These incentive schemes usually contain only one “tool” to do the job, such as a PDR program or
a fund-matching program designed to purchase conservation easements. Such schemes are
woefully inadequate to combat the pervasive market pressures to develop agricultural land which
exist on a state and local level. Because “states, and particularly local governments . . .
implement[ ] the majority of land use controls,”80 simply providing funding is not sufficient in
localities that do not approach land use planning in any sort of reasoned manner, for the trend in
favor of development is so prevalent that simply placing conservation easements on land in a
haphazard manner may do little good. While “the federal funding role for farmland preservation
is likely to expand . . . as the squeeze on farmland resources continues,”81 Congress’ funding
programs would be much more successful in preserving productive agricultural land if they were
deployed as merely one piece of a comprehensive land use planning model.
Second, most of the federal legislation enacted to date employs the very most expensive
land use planning tools, which are unlikely to prevent America’s most productive agricultural
land from being converted to other uses. The FFA, FAIR, and FSRIA all employ either PDR or
conservation easement programs, and all use federal funds—either exclusively or in combination
with state funds—to purchase development rights from private landowners. The problem with
such legislative schemes is that the most productive agricultural land in the country is located
near urban areas, and is likely to have a high fair market value. Therefore, funds used to
purchase development rights to such land do not go very far. Moreover, landowners in such
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areas may be reluctant to sell the development rights to their land once the fair market value
reaches a certain point. For example, if a landowner can sell his land outright at $50,000 per
acre, or sell only the development rights at $25,000 per acre, the decision may be a foregone
conclusion. The bottom line is that when only these limited land use planning tools are
employed, very little is actually accomplished in the way of protecting America’s most
productive agricultural land. To the extent these tools are deployed, Congress needs to take steps
to ensure that their impact is maximized. Again, if these programs were implemented a part of a
comprehensive land use planning model, Congress would get much more bang for its buck.
Otherwise, the impact of federal legislation will continue to be minimal.

B. State and Local Protection for Agricultural Land

Nearly all substantive programs designed to protect agricultural land are currently
implemented at a state or local level. 82 The federal government certainly has an important role
to play in effective land use planning, particularly from an organizational perspective. However,
many land use planning measures are necessarily implemented by state and local governments,
for many land use planning “tools” are not readily accessible to the federal government.83 As the
conversion of agricultural land has become an increasingly relevant issue in recent years, more
and more state and local governments have begun implementing various programs designed to
protect their productive agricultural land. In fact, every state currently has in place some form of
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legislation designed to protect and preserve agricultural land, although the level of protection
varies wildly from state to state.84
While every state has implemented some sort of program designed to protect agricultural
land, “[m]ost states have not done a good job of coordinating these techniques into a strategic
package,”85 which explains in part the increasing rate of farmland conversion. Even Oregon’s
land use planning program, widely hailed as the most successful in the nation and imitated by
several states,86 has not been entirely successful; Oregon’s agricultural land continues to be
converted at increasing rates despite the fact that Oregon has the most comprehensive land use
planning model in the nation.87 Therefore, while farmland conversion has been recognized as a
concern in every state, there currently exists no universally recognized solution to the problem.
This Section discusses a variety of land use planning techniques implemented by state and local
governments, addressing both the positive and negative aspects of each. It also discusses
Oregon’s land use planning model in depth, pointing out the various techniques used by Oregon
on both a state and local level and addressing the problems Oregon has encountered in
administering its comprehensive land use planning scheme.

1. Land Use Planning “Tools” for State and Local Governments

A wide variety of land use planning techniques are currently being utilized by state and
local governments to protect and preserve agricultural land. To begin with, every state now
offers a favorable property tax program designed to allow agricultural land to be taxed according
84
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to its value as agricultural land, rather than its fair market value.88 For example, agricultural land
in Utah is taxed “according to its use value”89 under the Farmland Assessment Act (“FAA”).90
The FAA was enacted because, as is the case in many states, “urban growth was encroaching on
rural areas and . . . if farmland was taxed at market value, farmers . . . would find it difficult to
continue to devote their property to low-profit farming operations.”91 This is typical of the
situation facing agricultural land in many states. Because most productive agricultural land is
located near urban areas, it is likely to have a much higher fair market value than agricultural
land in rural localities. If agricultural land in urban localities is taxed at its fair market value
rather than according to its current use, the taxes are likely to be exponentially higher. When this
occurs, agricultural land owners may be forced to sell their land to developers simply because, as
a result of the tax scheme, it is not financially efficient to continue to use the land for agricultural
production.
While property tax programs designed to benefit owners of agricultural land do tend to
decrease developmental pressure, they are inherently capable of manipulation when not
employed along with other land use planning techniques as part of a comprehensive plan to
protect agricultural land. It is not at all uncommon for developers to purchase agricultural land,
maintain it for a period of time as agricultural land to benefit from the favorable tax scheme, and
then develop and convert it to other uses. For example, in Utah the FAA permits landowners a
tax deduction for agricultural use when a parcel of land is five acres or larger and meets the other
requirements in the act regarding agricultural production.92 In Board of Equalization of Salt
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Lake County v. Utah State Tax Com’n ex rel. Judd,93 the Utah Supreme Court considered the
application of the FAA to a parcel of agricultural land that had been subdivided for development
and sale, yet maintained as agricultural land until development began in order to qualify for the
tax exemption.94 Though the court noted that such a use did “not comport” with the intent of the
statute and stated that the FAA effectively created a “tax loophole” for developers, the court
allowed the tax deduction because it technically comported with the statute.95
Every state has also enacted some form of a “right-to-farm” law, which helps protect
agricultural landowners operating in areas contiguous to urban or suburban areas from private
nuisance suits.96 In general, right-to-farm laws protect agricultural landowners by limiting the
circumstances under which neighboring landowners can bring a cause of action based on
nuisance.97 For example, an agricultural landowner may need to fertilize his fields in the spring.
Fertilization frequently causes unpleasant odors, which neighboring landowners may want to
prevent. However, in localities with right-to-farm laws, the neighboring landowners would
likely be unable to maintain a nuisance suit to enjoin the agricultural landowner from fertilizing.
Thus, right-to-farm laws have the effect of sparing agricultural landowners from incurring costly
litigation expenses in such suits.
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While favorable tax schemes and right-to-farm laws are employed by every state in
America, other land use planning tools are not as pervasive. The extent to which agricultural
land is protected and the variety of tools that are employed to do so varies wildly from state to
state. Perhaps the most important land use planning tool is the agricultural zoning scheme, along
with its many variants and complementary programs. Every state utilizes some sort of zoning
scheme to classify various categories of land and define the uses to which a parcel of land may
be put in each category. For example, land may be zoned for commercial, residential, or
agricultural use, with these categories often divided into subcategories to delineate various uses
within each category. In general, agricultural zoning schemes “impose restrictions on the
amount and type of development” that may occur within the zone, thereby preventing the land
from being converted to other uses.98 Agricultural zoning schemes have become the “most
widely used means by which municipalities restrict development and preserve farmland,”99 and
are now “the foundation of most farmland preservation efforts.”100 As of 1997, twenty-six states
utilized agricultural zoning in some form.101
In general, there are two major types of agricultural zoning schemes: exclusive and nonexclusive agricultural zoning, the latter being the most popular. An exclusive agricultural zoning
scheme typically “prohibits any use of the land other than agricultural,” although “compatible or
accessory buildings” are usually allowed.102 Because exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are
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so restrictive, they are very rarely used, usually only when “farming is the dominant land use, the
farmland is in large contiguous blocks, and there are few nonfarm dwellings or other nonfarm
buildings in the area.”103 Because it is usually applied to large areas of land, exclusive
agricultural zoning “avoids the problem of leapfrog and buckshot development,” or suburban
sprawl.104 Thus, exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are highly effective land use control
devices when it comes to simply preserving productive agricultural land. However, they also run
a high risk of provoking litigation—particularly Fifth Amendment “takings” challenges105—
when applied to areas with any sort of non-agricultural development already in place because
they are so restrictive. Few states have used exclusive agricultural zoning schemes, although
Hawaii, Oregon, and Wisconsin have successfully introduced them as part of their state land use
planning models.106
In contrast with exclusive agricultural zoning schemes, non-exclusive agricultural zoning
schemes allow land within the zoned area to be used for non-agricultural purposes, though
agricultural use is usually encouraged and stimulated by the particular structure of the scheme.107
When properly used, non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are extremely effective in
balancing competing interests, particularly between development and preservation. Because of
their flexibility, these schemes are used much more widely than exclusive agricultural zoning
schemes.
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Non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are implemented in a variety of ways. For
example, many state and local governments preserve agricultural land by implementing large
minimum lot size restrictions.108 These restrictions are usually tailored to correspond to the
minimum size of parcels of agricultural land in the area.109 This is a particularly popular
technique because the size restrictions can be changed gradually as needed to allow development
to proceed in an orderly and planned fashion.110 Another approach often utilized in nonexclusive agricultural zones is to allow land to be developed more intensely based on the size of
the parcel. This is usually accomplished by the implementation of a “sliding-scale” agricultural
zone, “which decreases the dwellings per acre as the acreage goes up.”111 For example, a
sliding-scale zone might permit one dwelling for the first five acres, two for the first twenty, and
so on. The effect is to “permit[ ] greater residential development for smaller parcels,”112 which
are more likely to have passed into the residentialor commercial land market due to their size
and decreased profitability. Another form of area-based allocation is the fixed-area allocation,
which is a simple allocation of building rights according to acreage.113 For example, in a zone
which allowed one dwelling per twenty-five acres, a landowner who owned 100 acres could
build four dwellings.
Non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes also frequently employ buffer zones to
concentrate development in certain areas within the broader agricultural zone. This is often
accomplished through “cluster zoning,” “which establishes overall density restrictions . . . but
permits small lot ‘clustering’ of actual development on the property.”114 For example, in an
108
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agricultural zone with a twenty-five acre minimum lot size a landowner with 100 acres would be
entitled to four dwellings, but permitted to “cluster” them in a corner of the property to and
preserve the rest of the property as open agriculturalspace. Most often utilized in suburban
settings, critics argue that cluster zoning can lead to conflicts with non-farming neighbors,
fragmentation of farmland, and an atmosphere of impermanence.115 A more popular approach is
to simply create an intermediate buffer zone between areas zoned for agricultural and residential
or commercial use. Though zoned as agricultural, a buffer zone usually has a smaller minimum
lot size requirement, such as five or ten acres. In essence, a buffer zone creates a transitional
boundary between agricultural and residential or commercial land. This has the advantage of
planning for future development while still preserving prime agricultural land because
development can proceed outside the agricultural zone and eventually proceed to the buffer zone
when the locality deems it appropriate.
A distinction must be drawn between a buffer zone implemented within an agricultural
zoning scheme and an urban growth boundary (“UGB”). A UGB is, “in essence, a line drawn
beyond which development will be prohibited, thus directing growth pressure inward instead of
sprawling out.”116 In comparison to a transitional buffer zone, a UGB simply establishes a set
boundary between agriculturally zoned land and land zoned for other uses. UGBs are most often
used in areas immediately contiguous to developed land, thus preserving the areas beyond.
Because of this, UGB areas tend to experience a great deal of market pressure from the abutting
urban land. As a result, local governments may feel heightened pressure to grant variances to
allow parcels of land within the agricultural zone to be used for other purposes, and eventually to
rezone the agricultural land entirely.
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Agricultural zoning has become the most common land use planning tool used to protect
agricultural land because it offers “several distinct advantages”117 over other land use control
devices. Because zoning in general is “a familiar and widely used land use control
mechanism,”118 most people recognize and understand zoning on some level, which is likely to
lead to greater acceptance. In addition, agricultural zoning schemes “restrict[ ] a landowner’s
own decision to convert the property to more intensive uses, thus avoiding the limitations of
voluntary programs,” such as conservation easements.119 Agricultural zoning schemes are also
inexpensive in relation to other land use control devices120 because the cost of preservation is
placed on individual landowners—by eliminating development opportunities and restricting land
to agricultural use, agricultural zoning “shift[s] the cost of farmland preservation from society as
a whole to landowners themselves.”121 Thus, agricultural zoning defuses, to an extent, the most
prevalent factor influencing the conversion of productive agricultural land: market demand.
Agricultural zoning is particularly effective in defusing market pressures to develop if a
locality is successful in zoning a large area of land for agricultural use.122 Localities can
preserve their most productive land, creating a “critical mass” to “keep individual farmers from
becoming isolated islands in a sea of residential neighborhoods.”123 This helps “limit land
speculation, which drives up the fair market value of farm and ranch land,” and also helps
reinforce the concept of “agriculture as a long-term, economically viable activity, instead of an
117
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interim land use.”124 When a large amount of agricultural land is preserved, agricultural zoning
“keep[s] land prices down and reduce[s] the pressure to sell for the higher development
value.”125 In addition, landowners are less likely to find themselves embroiled in nuisance suits,
for they are less likely to be surrounded “by neighbors who are offended by noxious farm odors
and chemical spraying.”126 A properly implemented agricultural zoning scheme also “helps
promote orderly growth by preventing sprawl into rural areas.”127 In short, agricultural zoning
schemes can be an extremely effective land use planning tool in protecting agricultural land,
promoting organized development, and preventing uncontrolled sprawl.
Despite their many advantages, agricultural zoning schemes are not without their
problems. Agricultural zoning “is not a permanent measure to preserve farmland because
rezonings can occur by a vote of the local legislature.”128 Because the character and disposition
of localities are never a constant, land that is zoned for agricultural use may be rezoned once
citizens who want to sell their land at a higher developmental value garner enough support to
prompt a rezoning. This is especially problematic given that those who have their land zoned for
agricultural use often perceive as unfair the placement of societal preservation costs on a few
landowners.129 Because land zoned for agricultural use is likely to be less valuable than
developable land, agricultural zoning may remove equity and credit values from the land,
reducing the amount of equity against which landowners may borrow.130 Landowners who hold
the majority of their wealth in their land may “view their land as both a retirement fund and an
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insurance policy.”131 In addition, because much of the country’s productive agricultural land is
located on the urban fringe, landowners in such areas may not see agricultural zoning as a
guarantee against suburban sprawl and eventual conversion.132 Thus, many agricultural
landowners resent agricultural zoning because it infringes on their ability to sell their land at its
highest value, and believe that “if most of the benefits from preservation go to society as a
whole, then the cost of preservation should be placed on society as well.”133 Because
landowners often dispute the fairness and validity of agricultural zoning, agricultural zoning
schemes lead to “frequent legal challenges.”134
In addition, when agricultural zoning schemes are not properly implemented, they may
actually lead to heightened developmental pressures and increased suburban sprawl. For
example, if a locality with a large amount of land zoned for agricultural use consistently grants
variances that allow intensive development, the effectiveness of the agricultural zoning scheme
is sacrificed. Also, many localities employ agricultural zones that permit residential
development on smaller parcels of land.135 Such agricultural zoning schemes are easily
manipulated to create large blocks of agricultural “estates,” which are nothing more than
residential land on which agricultural production is done only to the extent to meet the minimum
required by the zoning scheme.136 Thus, developers can easily accomplish an end-run around an
agricultural zoning scheme that is not implemented in a comprehensive, well-planned manner to
131
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address this possibility. Such ineffective agricultural zoning schemes “often hasten the decline
of agriculture by allowing residences to consume far more land than necessary,”137 leading to
leapfrog development and enhanced suburban sprawl.
Where non-voluntary agricultural zoning schemes place the costs of preservation on
individual landowners, other land use planning tools place the burden directly on taxpayers. For
example, PDR programs use tax proceeds to purchase development rights directly from
agricultural landowners.138 Closely related to PDR programs are transfer of development rights
(“TDR”) programs, which transfer developable land to landowners in exchange for the
development rights on landowners’ agricultural land.139 Conservation easements work in a very
similar manner—the owner of the agricultural land grants an easement to allow agricultural
production to continue. Conservation easements can either be bought with tax funds, as with
PDR or TDR programs, or donated by agricultural landowners. These programs avoid the
pressures which agricultural zoning schemes are subject to because the permitted use of the land
cannot be changed by a simple rezoning. Rather, the development rights to the land must be
bought from their holder, usually the state or federal government.140 However, because these
programs are voluntary, they do not produce the same results that agricultural zoning schemes
do. Donated conservation easements, for example, are only implemented at the whim of private
landowners. PDR, TDR, and purchased conservation easement programs are very expensive,
and as a result have little impact on preserving productive agricultural land when they are not
implemented as part of a larger land use planning scheme. Because most productive agricultural
land is located on the urban fringe, it is likely to have a high fair market value. As a result, when
137
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voluntary programs are implemented to purchase development rights on such land, the funds are
not likely to stretch very far.
In considering the effectiveness of voluntary programs, the role of non-governmental
actors should not be overlooked. There are a variety of non-governmental entities, such as land
trusts, that operate outside of the formal governmental structure, using private funds to purchase
the development rights to agricultural land or even to purchase agricultural land outright.141
These private organizations typically work at a local level, although national organizations, such
as the Nature Conservancy, are organized for the same purpose. Such organizations frequently
step into the breach when land use planning measures are not adequately protecting and
preserving agricultural land.142 Unfortunately, their efforts are organized only according to their
internal plans, and not as part of a comprehensive governmental effort. As a result, these
organizations function in an ad hoc manner, much like the federal government. If land use
planning had any sort of direction on a national level, the efforts of these organizations would be
far more effective, for they could organize their work in a manner that complemented the
national plan.
In summary, a wide variety of land use planning tools are available to help states protect
and preserve their valuable agricultural land. However, these tools are rarely successful when
employed in isolation. Rather, each tool has its respective strengths and weaknesses. Therefore,
the most effective way to balance the competing interests between development and preservation
is to deploy these tools in a manner that allows them to complement one another and play on
their respective advantages. The increasing rates of agricultural land conversion can be
explained, at least in part, by states’ general failure to implement a comprehensive land use
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planning model that accomplishes this. However, several states have attempted to do exactly
that, though not with perfect success. The following Section examines Oregon’s comprehensive
land use planning model, which incorporates a variety of the land use planning tools discussed
above.

2. Oregon: An (Almost) Effective Statewide Land Use Planning Model

Oregon’s statewide land use planning program, designed to protect and preserve
agricultural land, has been credited as the most comprehensive model in the nation.143 As a
result, several states have recently enacted similar programs.144 However, studies have shown
that productive agricultural land continues to be developed and converted to other uses in Oregon
at increasing rates despite the existence of its comprehensive model. Therefore, while the
Oregon plan serves as an example of the manner in which various land use planning tools can be
used to complement one another, it is also a lesson in the intricacies and pratfalls inherent in
balancing the need for development with the goal of agricultural preservation.
Oregon implemented its state-wide land use planning program, featuring a farmland
protection program, in 1973.145 Oregon’s program sets out certain statewide land use planning
goals, including the protection of agricultural land, and empowers the state government to
periodically review each county’s comprehensive land use planning program to ensure that it
complies with the goals.146 Each county in Oregon is required to identify its prime agricultural
lands, designate them in its comprehensive plan, and zone them for exclusive farm use
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(“EFU”).147 Thus, EFU zones allow only agricultural production and accessory uses. In EFU
zones, agricultural land benefits from property tax deferrals and is protected from nuisance suits
by right-to-farm laws.148 In addition to the mandatory EFU zones, many counties in Oregon
have created UGBs and buffer zones designed to direct residential and commercial development
inward and prevent suburban sprawl from claiming intermediate agricultural land.149
The Oregon Legislature has also created a Land Use Board of Appeals (“LUBA”), a three
judge panel that decides all land use cases. 150 While LUBA decisions are binding, parties have
the ability to appeal to the state courts.151 Oregon courts have held that citizens are entitled to a
private right of action with regard to land use issues,152 and have construed standing broadly,
allowing anyone who participates in a local proceeding to appeal an adverse decision.153 Finally,
the Oregon Supreme Court has held that zoning decisions are not entitled to presumptive
validity, which effectively shifts the burden of proof in cases challenging zoning decisions to
local governments, requiring them to justify land use decisions in light of the comprehensive
land use planning program.154
While Oregon has shown great foresight by enacting a statewide land use planning
program designed to address agricultural land conversion, the program has its deficiencies. As
discussed above, prime agricultural land continues to be converted at increasing rates in Oregon.
This may indicate that the state is not managing its growth in a way that strikes a proper balance
between development and agricultural land protection. It has been suggested that the increased
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rates of conversion are a result of the fact that the state program was implemented fairly
slowly.155 However, Oregon has had over thirty years to fine-tune its program, yet the rates
continue to escalate. At this point, systemic problems, such as those detailed below, are more
likely at fault.
The statewide adoption of land use planning goals, while laudable, is insufficient to
establish the infrastructure necessary to control development. Under the current program, each
county must comply with statewide goals, but the comprehensive land use plan is different in
each county. Oregon’s program would be far more efficient if this structure was reversed, and a
flexible comprehensive plan adopted at the statewide level. By doing so, Oregon could provide
its individual counties with an established framework to help implement statewide goals. The
implementation of the various land use planning tools contained in the state plan could then be
tailored to suit the individual nature of each county, ensuring that each piece was being used with
the end goal in mind: an appropriate balance between development and protection.
Oregon’s plan has also not proven itself capable of responding to ordinary market
pressures. The UGBs and buffer zones employed by many of the counties in Oregon have
actually been shown to increase suburban sprawl and the conversion of productive agricultural
land because of the widespread prevalence of “hobby farms.”156 For example, over 350,000
acres of land are zoned for rural residential—with three to five acre minimum lot sizes—in the
Willamette Valley, perhaps Oregon’s most productive agricultural region.157 As discussed
above, zoning schemes that allow such development frequently promote suburban sprawl as the
land becomes more developed. In addition, Oregon’s UGB’s and buffer zones have shown a
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great tendency to increase housing prices within their boundaries.158 As this occurs, suburban
sprawl and leapfrog development are encouraged because the market exerts pressure to expand
outward to EFU zones.159 Thus, the allowance of “hobby farms” seriously endangers productive
agricultural land.160
Oregon has certainly set the standard by being the first state to adopt a statewide program
designed to protect agricultural land. Yet, the mixed success of the program and the deficiencies
identified above demonstrate that additional measures are needed. In general, “more direction,
monitoring, and enforcement is needed . . . to help counties comply with urban growth
boundaries, channel rural development . . . and apply agricultural zoning to pursue the goal of
protecting farmland in large blocks.”161 While Oregon’s land use program should inform the
development of a comprehensive land use planning scheme designed to protect agricultural land,
Oregon’s program should be viewed as a building block rather than a standard.

IV. LAND USE REGULATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL “TAKINGS” CHALLENGES

In developing a comprehensive land use planning model, care must be taken to ensure
that the model meets established legal standards. When governments implement land use
planning schemes, “they are influencing land values and the potential wealth of landowners.”162
Because land use planning tools—particularly non-voluntary land use planning tools such as
agricultural zoning schemes—have such an influence on the private sector, they frequently
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provoke legal challenges. Therefore, the legal implications of land use planning schemes must
be taken into account, and programs must be drafted with these legal implications in mind. The
following discussion addresses the most important legal consideration, the Fifth Amendment
“takings” challenge, with particular emphasis placed on this legal doctrine’s application to nonvoluntary agricultural zoning schemes.
Zoning in general has long been recognized as an acceptable use of governmental “police
power” under the Tenth Amendment.163 The United States Supreme Court first addressed the
validity of zoning schemes in the landmark case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty
Co.164 In Euclid, the court held that zoning schemes are an acceptable use of police power so
long as they are “asserted for the public welfare”165—in other words, “to achieve a clearly
defined public purpose.”166 Applied to agricultural zoning, this constitutional test is met if the
legislation enabling the zoning scheme declares the protection of agricultural lands to be an
important public goal and the agricultural zoning scheme is implemented in a manner consistent
with the enabling legislation.167 In addition, it is advisable for states to take the additional step of
employing agricultural zoning pursuant to a “carefully drafted comprehensive plan,”168 rather
than on an ad hoc basis.169 While these initial legal constraints must be considered by states
adopting agricultural zoning schemes, the “primary and most significant”170 legal challenges to
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zoning schemes come in the form of Fifth Amendment171 “takings” challenges.172 This form of
legal challenge is common “because of the significant economic impact that agricultural zoning
can have on land values as compared to alternative uses.”173 Because a depressed property value
is almost invariably the result of an agricultural zoning scheme, states should take precautions
when drafting comprehensive land use planning models to ensure that their agricultural zoning
schemes comply with the applicable legal standards, particularly those set forth in the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.174
Current takings doctrine is derived from two major Supreme Court cases: Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council175 and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.176 The
“regulatory taking” doctrine, first defined in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,177 “recognizes
that in very limited situations the economic impact of a land use regulation might be so severe as
to constitute an unconstitutional taking of property.”178 When this occurs, the government may
not apply the land use regulation to the land at issue without compensating the landowner for the
taking.
A land use regulation may be found to be an unconstitutional taking of property under
either of two separate tests. First, a land use regulation may be an unconstitutional taking of
property under Lucas if it deprives a landowner of all economically viable use of the property—
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in other words, if it is a complete taking.179 Second, a land use regulation may amount to a
taking even where it does not deprive the landowner of all economically viable use of his
property if the Penn Central test is met.180 Under the Penn Central test, a court conducts a
multi-factored inquiry into the application of a land use regulation to a parcel of property,
focusing on “the character of the government action, its economic impact, and the degree of
interference with investment-backed expectations.”181 Thus, the analysis applied to a takings
claim when a land use restriction is challenged is a two-step process: (1) whether the regulation
deprives the land of all economically viable use; and (2) if not, whether the regulation still
qualifies as a taking under the Penn Central factors. Though the Supreme Court has never
applied this analysis to an agricultural zoning scheme, “a significant number of lower courts
have . . . with the vast majority of cases holding that the restriction was not a taking.”182 Lower
courts have consistently held that agricultural zoning is not a taking under the Lucas test where
“the land is suitable for agricultural use and is economically viable.”183 Lower courts have also
regularly held that agricultural zoning meets the Penn Central test.184 Most courts that have
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struck down agricultural zoning schemes have done so because the land the scheme was being
applied to was unsuitable for farming.185
While Lucas and Penn Central provide the framework for takings challenges, the Court’s
opinion in Palazzolo “has the potential of significantly impacting regulatory takings analysis,”
including agricultural zoning, because “the Court’s analysis is applicable to a broad array of land
use restrictions.”186 Palazzolo involved a “wetlands restriction which had been in place when the
claimant acquired the property and had the effect of prohibiting all development except the
possible building of a house on several uplands acres.”187 Prior to Palazzolo, lower federal
courts had consistently held that landowners with notice of a land use restriction at the time the
property was purchased were precluded from maintaining a takings claim.188 However, the
Court expanded its takings jurisprudence in Palazzolo by holding that prior notice of a restriction
does not preclude a takings claim.189 The Court concluded that the plaintiff had not been
deprived of all economically viable use of the property under the Lucas test, but remanded the
case for a determination of whether the Penn Central test had been met.190 Thus, under
Palazzolo a landowner may establish that a taking has occurred under Penn Central even if the
land use restriction at issue was in effect at the time the property was purchased and the
landowner is not deprived of all economically viable use of his property.
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Although Palazzolo altered the regulatory takings landscape, states that are administering
their land use planning schemes appropriately will likely not be affected by the change. Initially,
Palazzolo affirmed the principle that even minimal economic viability is enough to avoid a
categorical taking under Lucas.191 Thus, agriculturally zoned land meets the Lucas test as long
as the land to which the zoning scheme applies is actually suitable for agricultural use, as lower
federal courts have long held.192 Because this is a very low burden, any zoning scheme that is
actually designed to protect agricultural land should meet the Lucas test.
The real open question in the aftermath of Palazzolo involves the application of the Penn
Central factors to land use regulations. While prior notice of a land use restriction no longer
precludes a takings claim, Justice O’Connor indicated in a concurring opinion (which four other
justices joined) that notice is a relevant factor for courts to consider in addressing the third Penn
Central factor: the degree to which a land use restriction interferes with a landowner’s
reasonable investment backed expectations193 (which Penn Central labeled as the most important
factor in the analysis).194 Therefore, a landowner who purchases a parcel of property zoned for
agricultural use is still unlikely to mount a successful takings challenge under Penn Central
because his investment backed expectations will necessarily be set by the zoning in place at the
time of purchase. However, an agricultural zoning scheme that is applied to land that was
previously zoned for other uses may be in danger. For example, if a state decided to apply an
agricultural zoning scheme to a large block of land that had been zoned for commercial use, the
landowners’ investment backed expectations would likely be diminished by the agricultural
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zoning scheme. Even in such a situation, however, the concept of “regulatory risk” recognized
in Lucas195 suggests that another of the Penn Central factors, such as the character of the
governmental action, may be necessary for a court to hold that the Penn Central test had been
met. To be safe, though, state and local governments should identify currently productive
agricultural land to which to apply agricultural zoning rather than attempting to convert land
zoned for other uses to agricultural production. In general, if an agricultural zoning scheme is
implemented as part of a comprehensive land use plan, is rationally based on accurate
information regarding the composition of a locality’s lands, and is applied systematically rather
than in isolated instances, it is unlikely that a takings challenge to an agricultural zoning scheme
will be successful under Palazzolo. While takings claims will continue to be a legitimate
concern for state and local governments, properly conceived and implemented comprehensive
land use planning schemes will be upheld under current takings jurisprudence.

V. SUGGESTIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLANNING MODEL

Land use planning is a complex and multi-faceted task. The widespread development
and conversion of productive agricultural land is the result of many variables, which may be
more or less influential in any given state or locality. Because of this, land use planning to
balance development and agricultural land preservation will not be the same in every situation.
If the exact same scheme were implemented everywhere, the results would vary wildly; while
conversion rates would decrease in some localities, they would likely increase in others.
Therefore, a properly conceived land use planning model must be flexible enough to account for
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differences among states and localities, yet capable of producing predictable and similar results.
This can only be accomplished by incorporating various land use planning tools and allowing
them to be adjusted to suit the individual character and composition of each state. In this
manner, land use planning tools can be deployed in a complementary fashion, with one land use
planning tool’s strengths making up for another’s weaknesses. The final goal of this Article is to
suggest a comprehensive land use planning model that incorporates a variety of land use
planning tools in this manner, thus creating a model that is capable of addressing agricultural
land conversion in any state or locality.
To begin with, a comprehensive land use planning model needs to be just that:
comprehensive. As discussed above, states must be aware of the legal implications of land use
regulations, and ensure that land use planning is done in a manner that meets established legal
standards.196 To accomplish this, states need to draft enabling legislation indicating that the
establishment and maintenance of a proper balance between development and agricultural land
protection is an important state goal.197 In addition, states need to take care to ensure that the
land use planning scheme is consistently implemented in a manner that comports with this
goal.198 Arbitrary variations from the overarching goal risk being challenged as inconsistent with
the state’s goal.199 Moreover, ad hoc applications of land use planning regulations to individual
parcels of property are at particular risk for legal challenge.200 In short, states need to ensure that
land use regulations are imposed as part of a well-planned, strategic package—a comprehensive
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package in which each land use planning tool is utilized in a manner consistent with the state’s
goal.
A necessary prerequisite to the establishment of a comprehensive land use planning is an
intensive information-gathering process to determine the character and composition of states’
land. A comprehensive land use planning model cannot be applied comprehensively if states
have insufficient information about their own makeup.201 To this end, detailed surveys and
statistical analyses are needed. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. Initially, the
federal government should assist in the effort by updating the LESA information gathering
system and making it available to every state. The federal LESA system needs to be reworked so
that the value of agricultural land is not discounted to account for increased developmental
pressure. Because the majority of the productive agricultural land in America is located on the
urban fringe, developmental pressures are likely to be higher. By discounting for these
pressures, the federal LESA system ensures that that the value of much prime agricultural land is
artificially deflated, and thus deemed less worthy of protection.202 Instead, the federal LESA
system should simply rate agricultural land based on its productive value, and make this
information available to states. In this manner, states can better identify their most productive
agricultural land, regardless of location, and deploy their comprehensive land use planning
packages in a manner likely to protect it.
Second, states must have access to comprehensive state-specific land use information.
For example, states would benefit from information regarding existing land use, growth trends,
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developmental pressures, and desired changes in land use. This is another area where the federal
government can assist in the effort. To date, the federal government has enacted very limited
legislation to assist in the protection of agricultural land, providing funding for the
implementation of a very narrow class of voluntary land use planning tools.203 The federal
government could provide a much greater benefit to states by using federal funds to assist states
in establishing comprehensive land use planning models. The federal government could help
accomplish this by providing funds, either alone or in combination with state funds, to be used
for statewide information gathering processes. In other words, information gathering should be
organized from a top-down, national level, and should be accomplished in a manner that states
are provided with truly accurate and helpful land use information. The conversion of agricultural
land on a state level is a problem facing the nation as a whole, and Congress needs to address the
problem by enacting legislation that provides states with substantive support rather than simply
leaving land use planning to state and local governments. In the absence of federal assistance,
states need to provide funding on their own to gather all-inclusive information regarding the
composition and uses of their land.
In addition to funding the information gathering process, the federal government should
take additional steps to ensure that its programs complement comprehensive land use planning
on a state level. The best way to accomplish this is for the federal government itself to fund the
development of a comprehensive land use planning model that can be implemented in every state
in America. The federal government should develop such a model, identifying key areas of
federal involvement and which programs should be left to state and local governments. In this
manner, the federal government can ensure that its programs properly complement state land use
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planning regulations. In addition, the development of such a model would align the federal
government and state governments with the same goal. For example, the federal government has
enacted a variety of programs that fund, at least partially, states’ PDR and conservation easement
programs.204 Were the federal government to develop a model for comprehensive land use
planning, it could enact legislation that furthers the model, rather than leaving states to use
federal programs arbitrarily. Moreover, the federal government could then provide states with an
incentive to adopt its model by tying its funding efforts to the model, as it has done with highway
programs. States adopting the comprehensive land use planning model would then receive
federal funding to assist with the implementation of various land use planning tools. At the very
least, the federal government needs to give states an incentive to adopt comprehensive land use
planning models that curb unplanned development. At a minimum, the federal government
should adopt uniform standards for land use planning that states must meet in order to receive
federal funding. Thus, federal funding—for example, for PDR programs—would only be
provided to states with land use planning models meeting the minimum standards established by
the federal government.205
These proposals necessarily suggest a large role for the federal government in land use
planning. Major national land use planning initiatives have been proposed twice before, and
both times have proven unsuccessful. First, the USDA was reorganized during the New Deal in
a manner that allowed land use information to be fed to the USDA from the bottom up—in other
words, from the county level.206 Planning communities were organized in each community to
gather information on the composition of each locality by developing maps of existing land
204
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use.207 “Once existing land use was mapped, the local committees discussed desired changes in
land use and translated those changes onto a second county map.”208 This information was then
transmitted to the USDA, which was to organize its actions in accordance with the land use plans
of the localities.209 While this program seemed well-suited to harmonize local and national
interests, it proved too complex to manage due to the difficulty inherent in “creat[ing] a coherent
national policy simply by adding up the wishes of individual counties.”210
Second, national land use planning reemerged during the 1960s and 1970s as “a response
to rapid urban growth and the disappearance of open space”—the same motivating factors that
are once again relevant at the beginning of the twenty-first century.211 Senator Henry Jackson
proposed the National Land Use Policy Bill, which contained “a simple program of data
collection and agency organization” at the federal level.212 Under the program, “[t]he federal
government would give states money to gather data, classify land, and write a plan for
coordinating state land use decisions. Once each state had its affairs in order, federal agencies
could simply reference the states’ plans and determine how federal investments should be
allocated.”213 The plan ultimately failed in large part due to simple politics. President Nixon
proposed a competing bill, eventually combined with Jackson’s bill, which contained an
incentive scheme whereby states would only receive federal funds if they exercised certain land
use powers at the state rather than the local level.214 The joint bill appeared before Congress
several times, but was never passed.215
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While the model suggested in this Article does propose a large role for the federal
government, it does not necessarily amount to national land use planning.216 Rather, the
proposed model calls for nationally organized land use planning, with the federal government
providing a blueprint rather than a set of orders. The information gathering process proposed
here avoids the failures of the New Deal national land use planning proposals because it is
organized as a pyramid rather than a siphon. Instead of attempting to create a national land use
policy by referencing the sum total of community policies, the plan proposed here calls for a
nationally organized information gathering process to provide localities with information
necessary to implement responsible land use planning decisions. It also avoids the failures of the
national land use planning initiatives of the 1970s because it does more than simply reference
states’ land use plans in order to determine proper federal expenditures. Instead, the model
proposed here calls for a coherent national land use planning policy that installs as a goal the
preservation of valuable, productive agricultural land while allowing development to proceed in
an intelligent, organized fashion. In furtherance of this goal, a land use planning model capable
of accomplishing this goal can be developed by the federal government and provided for states to
implement. States could then implement the land use planning model in manner best suited to
their particular needs, identified in the first step of nationally organized information gathering.
In addition, by organizing land use planning on a national level, the federal government would
be better equipped to implement federal programs in a manner complementary to state land use
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planning schemes. It could also ensure that a wide variety of federal legislation, such as highway
funding and home mortgage programs, is implemented consistently with land use policy.
While the federal government certainly has a large and important role to play in land use
planning, it is true that most land use planning tools are properly implemented on a state and
local level. Thus, the remainder of this Section discusses the manner in which a variety of land
use planning tools can be effectively deployed in a complementary manner by state and local
governments as part of a comprehensive land use planning package. The discussion that follows
should be viewed as a suggestion for a comprehensive land use planning model. However,
essential to the plan proposed by this Article is the funding and development of such a model by
the federal government. Such a model should be extremely comprehensive, containing
suggestions for the deployment of land use planning tools in a great variety of situations along
with considerations to be taken into account in each instance. In essence, what this Article
proposes is a federally funded manual to effective land use planning. Such a model obviously
cannot be detailed to the extent necessary within the constraints of this Article. Therefore, the
model proposed here is but one example of the manner in which various land use planning tools
can utilized as part of a comprehensive model.
To begin with, a carefully planned statewide zoning strategy should be the backbone of
any land use planning program. The point of the initial information gathering step is to clearly
identify the location of various categories of land. Once this is accomplished, states can apply a
zoning scheme to classify these categories and define the uses which are allowed in each
category. Because agricultural zoning is such an effective method of preserving productive
agricultural land,217 it should be deployed to the furthest extent allowable under the law. States
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should apply exclusive agricultural zoning schemes to all large blocks of readily identifiable
agricultural land. Exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are the least expensive way for states to
preserve large areas of productive agricultural land, and are very effective at preventing suburban
sprawl from gradually diminishing the productivity of the area.218 In addition, states can
generally avoid legal challenges by limiting the application of exclusive agricultural zoning
schemes to large blocks of land that are currently well-suited to agricultural production and
where market pressures have not yet begun to mount.219 This type of agricultural zoning has
proven effective in Oregon, and other states should follow its lead.220
In addition to exclusive agricultural zoning, states should apply non-exclusive
agricultural zoning schemes to smaller blocks of productive agricultural land which are currently
well-suited for agricultural use.221 Because of the flexibility that non-exclusive agricultural
zoning schemes offer, they are more likely to be effective at balancing competing interests in
smaller areas of agricultural land, which are more likely to be subject to market pressures.222
Within these areas, state and local governments should implement their non-exclusive
agricultural zoning schemes in a variety of ways, depending on the particular needs of the
locality.223 Where possible, large minimum lot sizes should be imposed to prevent the
manipulation of the agricultural zoning scheme to create agricultural estates and hobby farms.
The largest minimum lot size possible for land in the area should be imposed. For example, if
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the smallest parcel of land in a certain block of agricultural land is twenty acres, the minimum lot
size should be set at twenty acres.
Where agricultural land has already been divided into smaller parcels, sliding-scale zones
should be used, with the highest barrier to development possible being imposed. For example, if
agricultural land in a given area is broken down into parcels averaging between ten and eighty
acres, the locality should begin the sliding-scale zone at ten acres to prevent the parcels from
being divided into smaller pieces. In addition, state and local governments should employ buffer
zones and UGBs to set agricultural land apart from urban and suburban development, but
carefully monitor their progress to ensure that problems such as those occurring in Oregon do not
surface.224 Cluster zoning should imposed only when it is iron-clad because it allows small
portions of agricultural land to be developed intensively, frequently creating subdivisions in the
corner of larger agricultural units that then exert developmental pressure on the rest of the
land.225 However, cluster zoning is effective at preserving a large piece of productive
agricultural land, and should be utilized if the continued viability of the agricultural portion of
the parcel can be guaranteed. If cluster zoning cannot be utilized in this manner, state and local
governments can implement fixed area allocations, imposing the largest possible minimum lot
size. In addition, state and local governments should establish UGBs between all land zoned for
agricultural use and land zoned for other uses wherever possible to force growth inward rather
than outward. When this is not feasible due to already established development, traditional
buffer zones should be employed, again with the largest minimum lot size possible.
State governments should also adopt programs to benefit agricultural land located within
their agricultural zones. Tax incentive programs are a necessity to prevent the value of
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agricultural land being driven up as development begins to encroach on the agricultural boundary
and exert market pressures.226 In addition, state governments should draft their tax incentive
legislation very strictly to prevent developers from taking advantage of favorable tax schemes
while preparing land for subdivision and development.227 This is particularly important in buffer
zones and non-exclusive agricultural zones employing sliding-scale or cluster zoning methods,
where more development opportunities exist. In addition, state governments should ensure that
right to farm laws are in place to protect agricultural landowners from litigation.228 Again, these
laws are particularly necessary in buffer zones and non-exclusive agricultural zones employing
sliding-scale or cluster zoning methods, where productive agricultural land is located in closer
proximity to residential or other development.
Although agricultural zoning is a necessary component of any comprehensive land use
planning model, it is not capable of adequately defusing market pressures to develop by itself.229
As applied to agricultural land that directly abuts urban or suburban development, agricultural
zoning may not be an effective land use planning tool. This is because there may be extensive
development interspersed with agricultural land in such areas, making application of an
agricultural zoning scheme less feasible. Because much of the productive agricultural land in
America is located near urban areas, this is a particularly important area of focus for state and
local governments enacting comprehensive land use planning schemes. While agricultural
zoning should be deployed to the extent possible, other voluntary land use planning tools may be
more effective in preserving agricultural land in such situations. 230 States should encourage
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owners of agricultural land to donate conservation easements on land located in such areas.
Conservation easements are effective in preserving agricultural production, and do not entail a
heavy financial burden on state and local governments.231 States can further encourage the
donation of conservation easements through incentive programs, such as favorable tax schemes
and deductions. In addition, states should employ PDR and TDR programs to secure
development rights on productive agricultural land. While these programs are the most
expensive land use planning tools, they are extremely effective in preserving productive
agricultural land.232 States should take advantage of federal funding for these programs to the
furthest extent possible, and carefully apply the funds to land which other land use planning tools
are unlikely to preserve. The federal government can assist in states’ efforts by increasing
funding for these programs and monitoring states’ use of the funds to ensure that federal
programs are having the maximum impact. States should also use state funds to implement these
programs, strategically employing these programs to purchase development rights to more
endangered agricultural land. Finally, governments at both the federal and state level should
coordinate their land use planning efforts with those of private organizations such as land trusts.
Such organizations frequently use private funds to purchase development rights to agricultural
land, and to date have done so outside of any organized governmental framework.233 By coopting the efforts of such organizations, governments can maximize the impact of private funds
and ensure that private efforts complement the comprehensive land use plan.
In summary, land use planning tools cannot be deployed in isolation, for they are only
truly effective when implemented in a complementary fashion as part of a comprehensive land
use planning package. Each level of government has its role in promoting intelligent land use
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planning. The federal government can provide individual states with structure and funding to
implement their land use planning schemes. States governments are necessarily the repository of
comprehensive land use planning, but must be given incentives to contribute to a broad national
goal. While state governments should be encouraged to adopt comprehensive land use planning
strategies, land use planning tools must be implemented on a local level, with state governments
providing the necessary oversight. Each piece of the puzzle must be complementary: the federal
government must ensure that its legislation complements state and local programs, and state
governments must ensure that each land use planning tool is deployed in a complementary
fashion. This is accomplished through the adoption of a comprehensive land use planning model
that is capable of adequately balancing market pressures in favor of development with the need
to preserve valuable agricultural land.

VI. CONCLUSION

Productive agricultural land is being developed and converted to suburban sprawl in
every state in America at increasing rates. This is not a problem that can be addressed in the
future: a program capable of reversing the trend needs to be developed and implemented now.
To date, no thoroughly comprehensive plan exists to effect the necessary change. While the
federal government and state and local governments have recently begun to address this problem,
their respective efforts are not synchronized and have not been successful. A comprehensive
land use planning model capable of responding to the many variables inherent in land use
planning is necessary. This Article represents an attempt to lay the groundwork necessary for
such a model. Thus, this Article suggests a framework for the development of a comprehensive
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land use planning strategy, a strategy that is flexible enough to adapt to the different composition
of each state. This model involves both the federal government and state and local governments,
and attempts to coordinate their respective capacities in a manner that they complement one
another. It also provides an example of the manner in which a variety of land use planning tools
may be deployed in a complementary fashion. By employing a wide variety of land use planning
tools, this model allows each individual land use planning tool to play to its strengths while other
tools account for its weaknesses. In addition, this model accounts for the legal framework in
which land use planning schemes operate, and should survive legal challenge if properly
implemented. By taking all of these factors into consideration, this Article lays the foundation
for a comprehensive land use planning model capable of adequately balancing the competing
interests between development and agricultural land preservation. The development of such a
model would prevent America’s productive agricultural land from being developed in a
haphazard fashion while allowing necessary development to occur in an intelligent, organized
manner.
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